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One of the most important changes in financial regulation after the global financial crisis of 2008 
has been the emergence of macroprudential regulation. Although there has been the claim that the 
emergence of macroprudential regulation characterizes an ontological shift in financial regulation, 
this article argues that it is a misleading interpretation caused by a conflation of ontological and 
explanatory claims. Macroprudential regulation has not been derived from an ontological shift but 
rather from an explanatory shift because the macroprudential assumption that the aggregate is more 
than the sum of individual parts is a causal or analytical, rather than ontological, assumption. The 
theoretical foundation of macroprudential regulation can be defined as nonreductive individualism that 
reconciles ontological individualism with explanatory nonreductionism. In contrast to nonreductive 
individualism, macrosocial ontology assumes that social entity can be ontologically distinct from 
individuals because social structure produces observable effects by constraining or enabling the 
interactions of individuals. A change in ontological assumptions is the most important criterion 
according to which the meaning of policy change is evaluated. We can distinguish fundamental changes 
from incremental ones by investigating whether the ontological assumptions of policy paradigms are 
changed. In this regard, the emergence of macroprudential regulation can be defined as an incremental 
change in financial regulatory paradigm
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1. IntroductIon
After the global financial crisis of 2008, there has been a growing consensus among 
financial regulatory policymakers that there is a need to “strengthen the macroprudential 
orientation of financial regulation and supervision” (Clement, 2010: 59). Referred to as “a 
new ideology and a big idea” (Haldane, 2009), macroprudential regulation “has risen with 
breathtaking speed from virtual obscurity to currency in the policymaking world” (Borio, 
2011: 1). With a focus on systemic risks endogenously generated by the collective, rather 
than individual, behavior of financial institutions, macroprudential regulation has changed 
the central focus of financial regulatory framework from the soundness of individual financial 
institutions to the soundness of the financial system as a whole. 
Macroprudential regulation provides a new understanding of the root causes of financial 
instability and regulatory approaches to financial markets. rejecting the premise that 
financial markets could be self-regulated by the prudential risk management of individual 
financial institutions, macroprudential regulation acknowledges the endogenous risks of 
financial markets that arise as the result of the interactions of individual prudential behaviors 
(Baker, 2010: 660-661). With an emphasis on the undesirable instability of the financial 
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system caused by the collective behavior of prudential financial institutions, macroprudential 
regulation aims to deal with the “systemic risk” of financial markets, rather than the 
“idiosyncratic risk” of individual institutions, with an objective of “limiting the likelihood of 
the failure, and corresponding costs, of significant portions of the financial system” (Crokett, 
2000).
Macroprudential regulation emphasizes that the prudential risk management of individual 
institutions is inadequate to maintain the stability of the financial system as a whole because 
of systemic risks generated by the result of the collective behavior of financial institutions. 
More specifically, macroprudential regulation take seriously the cross-sectional and time 
dimensions of financial risk in explaining the instability of the financial system. The cross-
sectional dimension of systemic financial risk is related to correlations and common 
exposures among financial institutions. Macroprudential regulation focuses more on similar 
portfolio holding among interconnected institutions in the financial system, rather than risk 
concentration within individual institutions, since if all individual institutions have the same 
kind of risky assets, it could engender the instability of financial system regardless of the 
level of risk exposure of individual institutions by causing a system-wide deterioration of 
balance sheets (Datz, 2013: 471-472).
In terms of the time dimension of financial risk, macroprudential ideas put an emphasis 
on the procyclicality of financial markets. The tranquility period of financial markets tends 
to weaken risk perceptions and strengthen optimistic expectations, eventually leading to the 
booming phase of financial cycle in which the expansion of liquidity increases asset prices 
and creates a financial bubble. When financial actors suddenly realize the high degree of 
exposure to risk, however, demand for low risky and liquid assets rapidly increases, thereby 
leading to the contractive phase of financial cycle in which the contraction of liquidity causes 
the prices of financial assets to plummet and makes the bubble bust (Frenkel and Rapetti, 
2009: 687). To alleviate procyclicality, macroprudential regulation stresses countercyclical 
capital buffers which help to reduce liquidity in the booming phase of the financial cycle and 
increase it in the contractive phase of the cycle.
There has been controversy surrounding the (potential) impact of macroprudential 
regulation on financial regulatory paradigm in the international political economy literature. 
The proponents of macroprudential have argued that although its fundamental meaning and 
instrumental mechanisms have not been fully appreciated and developed, macroprudential 
regulation has the potential to induce a fundamental change in the financial regulatory 
paradigm because the principles of macroprudential regulation are fundamentally different 
from neoliberal ideas in that they admit the endogenous nature of financial instability, thereby 
rejecting the self-regulation of financial markets and stressing the role of states in regulating 
financial markets (Baker, 2018; Baker and Widmaier, 2015; Best, 2016; Mackintosh, 2014).
In particular, the claim that macroprudential regulation can bring about a profound change 
in financial regulatory paradigm has been derived from the premise that a macroprudential 
call for the system as the primary scale of analysis has been accompanied by an ontological 
shift in financial regulatory paradigm. It is argued that the emergence of macroprudential 
regulation fits with a conception of paradigm shift termed by Khun (1962) or third-order 
change termed by Hall (1993) because its “macrosocial” ontology that “treats interactions 
between agents as having an independent standing, and sees the aggregate as more than 
the sum of individual parts” (Best and Widmaier, 2006: 617) represents a set of completely 
different assumptions about how financial markets are constituted and operate.
By and large, the critics of macroprudential regulation focus on the feasibility of 
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macroprudential regulation. Many of them have maintained that macroprudential regulation 
could not bring about only minor changes in financial regulatory paradigm since the meaning 
and policy significance of macroprudential regulation are vague and doubtful. according to 
them, the systemic risks on which macroprudential regulation focus are difficult to understand 
and identify. It is thus hard, if not impossible, to measure the systemic risks of financial 
markets and devise policy instruments to control systemic risks (Casey, 2015; Helleiner, 
2014; lombardi and Moschella, 2017; Mugge, 2014). 
In contrast to the critics focusing on the feasibility of macroprudential regulation, this 
article deals with the fundamental principles of macroprudential regulation. It argues that 
the claim that the emergence of macroprudential regulation characterizes an ontological 
shift in financial regulatory paradigm is a misleading interpretation caused by “a conflation 
of ontological and explanatory claims” (list and spiekermann, 2013: 641). Ontological 
claims are concerned about “what the social world is – its building blocks or what it consists 
of,” whereas explanatory claims are about “how the social world causally works – what 
sequences of events lead to one another or what mechanisms are operative” (epstein, 2015: 
151, emphasis original). While the ontological claim of financial regulatory paradigm is 
about what consists financial markets and how they are constructed, the explanatory claim 
of financial regulatory paradigm enunciates causal processes or pathways through which the 
macro outcomes of financial markets are brought into being.
In understanding a change in financial regulatory paradigm, it is important to distinguish 
two distinct types of ideational shift in financial regulation: explanatory and ontological shifts. 
Although some proponents of macroprudential regulation argue that the core assumption of 
macroprudential regulation that the aggregate is more than the sum of individual parts causes 
an ontological shift in financial regulatory paradigm (Baker, 2018; Baker and Widmaier, 
2015), this assumption should be seen as an explanatory, rather than ontological, assumption. 
The systemic risk on which macroprudential regulation focuses is caused by the complex 
interaction of self-interested rational individual actors. Therefore, the ontological assumption 
of macroprudential regulation can be characterized as individualistic, since macroprudential 
regulation does not acknowledge the ontological standing of social entity. What is novel for 
macroprudential regulation is its acknowledgement that the collective behavior of prudential 
financial institutions can bring about undesirable systemic outcomes. In this regard, the 
emergence of macroprudential regulation has not been derived from an ontological shift but 
rather from an explanatory shift in financial regulatory paradigm.
In order to clarify the difference between ontological and explanatory shifts in financial 
regulatory paradigm, this article seeks to distinguish macrosocial ontology from nonreductive 
individualism. Drawing on the philosophy of the mind and employing an analogy between 
the mental-physical relation and the social-individual one, some scholars have convincingly 
argued that ontological individualism is not only distinct from explanatory reductionism but 
also compatible with explanatory nonreductionism. explanatory reductionism assumes that 
social properties at the macro level are identical and reducible to individual properties at 
the micro level, whereas explanatory nonreductionism acknowledges that social properties 
are not always identical and reducible to individual properties. In particular, nonreductive 
individualism is an ideational stance that reconciles explanatory nonreductionism with 
ontological individualism that social world is made up solely of individuals and thus social 
properties are determined by the interactions of individuals (list and spiekermann, 2013; 
sawyer, 2002, 2003).
In contrast to nonreductive individualism, macrosocial ontology assumes that social 
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entity can be ontologically distinct from individuals, particularly because social structure 
can produce observable effects by constraining or enabling the interactions of individuals 
(Wendt, 1987). The most crucial difference between nonreductive individualism and 
macrosocial ontology is their different understandings of emergence, which means “the 
appearance of novelty or something previously absent or unprecedented, somehow fashioned 
out of, if remaining dependent upon, matters already existence” (lawson, 2016: 362). 
nonreductive individualism views emergence in terms of causal relations: the interaction of 
individuals gives rise to new social properties that cannot be causally reduced to individual 
properties. In contrast, macrosocial ontology considers that social structures that emerge 
from the interactions of individuals in a diachronic sense are ontologically autonomous 
from individuals in a synchronic sense because they are constitutive of the social actions of 
individuals.
although it is not easy to establish criteria to evaluate the meaning of policy change, 
paradigm shifts should be accompanied by a change in the ontological assumptions of policy 
paradigms because the ontological assumptions of policy paradigms are the fundamental 
principles that determine the social purposes and policy instruments of policy paradigms. 
therefore, a change in ontological assumptions is the most important criterion according 
to which the meaning of policy change is evaluated. In other words, we can distinguish 
fundamental changes from incremental ones by investigating whether the ontological 
assumptions of policy paradigms are changed.
this article argues that the theoretical foundation of macroprudential regulation is not 
macrosocial ontology but rather nonreductive individualism. The focus of macroprudential 
regulation on systemic risks is derived from its nonreductionist explanatory assumption that 
collective outcomes resulting from the interaction of prudential individual actors can be 
undesirable for the financial system as a whole. While the relative novelty of macroprudential 
regulation is derived from its nonreductionist explanatory assumption, the conservative nature 
of macroprudential regulation results from its individualistic ontological assumption. In this 
regard, the (potential) impact of macroprudential ideas on financial regulatory paradigm 
would not be as fundamental as a paradigm shift in a Kuhnian sense. the emergence of 
macroprudential regulation after the global financial crisis of 2008 can be defined as an 
incremental change in financial regulatory paradigm (Onis and guven, 2011: 470).
The paper is organized as follows. The first section explains the difference between 
ontological and explanatory assumptions of social explanation. The second section discusses 
the ontological and explanatory assumptions of macroprudential regulation. The third section 
explains how the macrosocial ontology of financial regulatory paradigm is different from the 
nonreductive individualism of macroprudential regulation. The study’s conclusions are given 
in the following section.
2. OnTOlOgy anD CaUsaTIOn
This section discusses theoretical arguments that justify a distinction between reductive 
individualism and nonreductive individualism not for the purpose of adjudicating which is a 
more appropriate approach to financial regulation but instead to clarify the ontological and 
explanatory assumptions of financial regulatory paradigm.
Prior to the global financial crisis of 2008, the dominant approach to financial regulation, 
which can be called microprudential regulation, focused on the soundness of individual 
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institutions. In contrast, macroprudential regulation whose importance has increased since 
the 2008 crisis has introduced ‘the system’ as the primary scale of analysis because it see 
financial risks as endogenously generated within the financial system by the collective 
behavior of individual financial institutions. It has been claimed that the difference in the 
primary scale of analysis between microprudential and macroprudential regulations is derived 
from their diametrically opposed ontological assumptions: macroprudential ideas endorse 
‘macrosocial ontology’, as opposed to the ‘individualistic ontology’ of microprudential 
regulation (Baker, 2018; Baker and Widmaier, 2015).
To evaluate the claim that macroprudential regulation induces an ontological shift in 
the financial regulatory paradigm, it is important to distinguish ontological claims from 
explanatory ones: the former is about “what the social world is – its building blocks or what 
it consists of” and the latter about “how the social world causally works – what sequences 
of events lead to one another or what mechanisms are operative” (epstein, 2016: 151). 
In particular, there are two different types of explanatory claims that are committed to 
ontological individualism: one assumes that ontological individualism necessarily entails 
explanatory reductionism and the other reconciles ontological individualism with explanatory 
nonreductionism. Following sawyer (2002, 2003), we can call the former “reductive 
individualism” and the latter “nonreductive individualism.”
Ontological individualism consists of two distinct claims: composition and supervenience. 
The composition claim of ontological individualism is that the social world is made up solely 
of individuals; the supervenience claim means that facts at the social level supervene on 
(are determined by) facts at the individual level (Ramstrom, 2018: 482). More specifically, 
supervenience individualism suggests that “if a collection of individual properties with a 
given set of relations causes a certain social property to obtain on one occasion, then that 
same collection of individual properties in that same set of relations on another occasion 
will cause the same social property to obtain” (sawyer, 2002: 543). In other words, the 
supervenience claim of ontological individualism implies that social properties cannot change 
without a change in individual properties. The supervenience claim is a logical corollary 
of the composition claim of ontological individualism because if society consists of only 
individuals, a change at the social level should be generated by a change at the individual 
level.
Ontological individualism is sometimes conflated with explanatory reductionism, in 
which all social phenomena can be causally reduced to individual ones. For instance, John 
stuart Mill argued that the social world or phenomena can be fully explained in terms of 
individual-level facts because social properties created by the interaction of individuals can 
be reduced to individual properties:
the laws of the phenomena of society are, and can be, nothing but the laws of the actions 
and passions of human beings united together in the social state. … Men are not, when brought 
together, converted into another kind of substance, with different properties. … Human beings in 
society have no properties but those which are derived from, and may be resolved into, the laws of 
the nature of individual man (Mill, 1889: 573).
There is also a view that explanatory reductionism is not an unavoidable result of 
ontological individualism. For instance, emile Durkheim endorsed ontological individualism 
but rejected explanatory reductionism:
Whenever elements of any kind combine, by virtue of this combination they give rise to 
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new phenomena. One is therefore forced to conceive of these phenomena as residing, not in the 
elements, but in the entity formed by the union of these elements. The living cell contains nothing 
save chemical particle, just as society is made up of nothing except individuals. … If, as is granted 
to us, this synthesis sui generis, which constitutes every society, gives rise to new phenomena … 
one is forced to admit that these specific facts reside in the society itself that produces them and not 
in its parts – namely its members (Durkheim, 1982: 39-40).
Durkheim’s holistic approach to social phenomena is not an ontological claim but an 
explanatory one, with a focus on causal relations between lower-level (individual) properties 
and higher-level (social) ones (list and spiekermann, 2013: 631; sawyer, 2001: 558; searle, 
2006: 59-62). His approach can be understood as “property dualism, which holds that social 
properties may be irreducible to individual properties, even though social entities consist of 
nothing more than individuals” (sawyer, 2002: 541). He argued that social properties “reside 
in the society … not in its parts” because the combination of individuals “gives rise to new 
phenomena,” although “society is made up of nothing except individuals.” In other words, he 
approved of ontological individualism but rejected explanatory reductionism.
What differentiates explanatory reductionism from explanatory nonreductionism is not 
the composition or supervenience claims of ontological individualism but type individualism, 
which means that every social property is identical and reducible to some individual-level 
properties (list and spiekermann, 2013; sawyer, 2002). While the composition claim of 
ontological individualism is necessarily related to its supervenience claim, it is not necessarily 
associated with type individualism in particular because of the multiple realizability of social 
properties, which means that although every social property supervenes on (is determined by) 
a combination of individual properties, the same social properties can be realized by multiple 
configurations of individual properties (sawyer, 2001: 556-558). For instance, the instability 
of the financial system can be caused not only by the unreasonably risky behaviors of 
individual financial institutions but also by the complex interaction of individually prudential 
behaviors. When social phenomena characterized by the same property (financial instability) 
can be realized by distinct individual properties (risky or prudential), it remains valid that 
social phenomena are determined by individuals (supervenience individualism). However, 
it is difficult to maintain that social properties are identical and reducible to individual 
properties (type individualism) because different individual-level properties could give rise to 
the same social property. In this regard, given the multiple realizability of social properties, 
it can be said that “only individuals exist and that social entities do not have a distinct 
existence, yet there may be irreducible social properties” (sawyer, 2001: 559).
given the distinction between ontological individualism and type individualism, 
ontological individualism is compatible with both “phenomenal monism” that the properties 
of social phenomena are identical and reducible to individual properties and “phenomenal 
dualism” that social phenomena supervene on individuals but can have different properties 
from individual ones (Ramstrom, 2018: 482-485). In this regard, there can be two distinct 
social explanations informed by ontological individualism: reductive individualism 
and nonreductive individualism. Reductive individualism adheres to both ontological 
individualism and explanatory reductionism, whereas nonreductive individualism reconciles 
ontological individualism and explanatory nonreductionism. Both of these explanations 
rest on ontological individualism, acknowledging that only individuals exist in the social 
world and that social phenomena are determined by individuals. However, while reductive 
individualism endorses type individualism by regarding social properties as identical and 
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reducible to individual properties, nonreductive individualism maintains that there is no one-
to-one correspondence between social and individual properties. In other words, nonreductive 
individualism accepts “analytical dualism,” in which the analysis of social properties can be 
separated from the analysis of individuals, while rejecting “ontological dualism,” in which 
social entities are autonomous from individuals.
3. THe nOnReDUCTIve InDIvIDUalIsM OF MaCROPRUDenTIal RegUlaTIOn
The distinction between reductive individualism and nonreductive individualism 
discussed above is helpful for understanding the theoretical status of regulatory approaches to 
financial markets. The microprudential approach to financial regulation can be seen as being 
informed by reductive individualism that endorses ontological individualism and explanatory 
reductionism because it maintains that “financial stability is ensured as long as each and 
every institution is sound” (Crockett, 2000). The ontological assumption of microprudential 
regulation is that financial markets are made up of nothing except individual institutions 
and, thus, that there are no entities to be addressed other than individual institutions. as a 
result, microprudential regulation focuses only on the behaviors of individual institutions. 
In addition, it also adheres to explanatory reductionism, assuming that the properties of the 
financial system as a whole are identical and reducible to those of individual institutions. 
Consequently, microprudential regulation presupposes that the soundness of individual 
institutions will result in the soundness of the financial system as a whole because its 
explanatory reductionism “equates the macro sphere and the micro sphere” (Colander et al., 
2009: 358).
In contrast, macroprudential regulation endorses nonreductive individualism with a view 
that systemic outcomes are determined by the collective, rather than individual, behavior of 
financial institutions. The key conceptual tool of macroprudential regulation in understanding 
systemic outcomes is the notion of a ‘fallacy of composition’ (Baker, 2013b: 115), which 
indicates that “what constitutes prudent behavior from the point of view of one institution 
may create broad problems when all institutions engage in similar behavior” (Jacome and 
nier, 2012: 30). The fallacy of composition in the financial market implies that the soundness 
of individual institutions can differ from the soundness of the financial system as a whole 
because individual institutions seeking to make themselves safer “can behave in a way that 
collectively undermines the system” (Brunnermeier et al., 2009: xvii). For instance, in a 
recession, selling assets and/or tightening lending standards can be seen as reasonable and 
even compelling in order to maintain the soundness of individual institutions when they 
are considered in isolation. If every institution simultaneously seeks to do the same thing, 
however, credit-crunch and fire-sale effects could result, thereby deteriorating the soundness 
of the entire financial system (Hanson et al., 2011: 5-7). given the fallacies of composition, 
the systemic properties of financial markets generated by the complex interaction of 
individual institutions are not identical to individual properties. Therefore, the maintenance 
of financial stability should be viewed “from a system perspective, rather than from the point 
of view each individual financial institution” (Morris and shin, 2009: 233).
some have argued that the systemic perspective of macroprudential regulation has 
been derived from its “macrosocial” ontology that “treats interactions between agents as 
having an independent standing, and sees the aggregate as more than the sum of individual 
parts” (Best and Widmaier, 2006: 617). according to this view, the macrosocial ontology 
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of macroprudential regulation “does not see the world as being just made up of atomistic 
individuals, but also includes social entities and forces that possess an autonomous standing” 
(Baker and Widmaier, 2015: 376-377). However, it is misleading to see the central focus of 
macroprudential regulation on systemic risks as the result of macrosocial ontology. In terms 
of ontological assumption, macroprudential regulation is not distinct from microprudential 
regulation: both are founded on ontological individualism in the sense that they explain 
systemic outcomes as the result of the action and interaction of individual financial 
institutions, disapproving of any entities that possess an independent ontological standing 
except for individual institutions.
Rather, the systemic perspective of macroprudential regulation results from its 
nonreductionist explanatory assumption, which sees the aggregate as more than just sum of 
its individual parts because the complex interaction of individual institutions characterized 
by the fallacies of composition gives rise to the distinct properties of the financial system 
from those of individual institutions. Macroprudential regulation considers not a systemic 
entity but rather the complex interaction of individual institutions as a main factor affecting 
the stability of the financial system as a whole. In this regard, the theoretical assumption 
of macroprudential regulation can be understood as nonreductive individualism because 
it rejects the explanatory reductionism of microprudential regulation without abandoning 
ontological individualism. It sees the financial system as constituted by individual institutions 
but argues that systemic outcomes are not simply the aggregation of individual properties.
The nonreductionist explanatory assumption of macroprudential regulation renders it 
distinct from the microprudential one by changing the central focus of financial regulation 
from the action of individual institutions to their interaction. However, their shared 
ontological individualism makes them similar and compatible in the sense that both seek only 
to regulate individual institutions, although macroprudential regulation is concerned about 
the soundness of the system as a whole and microprudential regulation about the soundness 
of individual institutions. Because its ontological assumption does not recognize any social 
entities except for individual institutions, macroprudential regulation also seeks to “manage 
system-wide dynamics by focusing on individual institutions” (Best, 2016: 50-51).
In terms of the time dimension of systemic risks, macroprudential ideas stress that 
prudential regulation should be tightened in booms and eased in recessions in order to flatten 
financial cycles. the regulatory measure of macroprudential regulation for rectifying the 
procyclicality of financial markets is to impose additional countercyclical capital buffers 
on individual institutions. With regards to the cross-sectional dimension of financial risks, 
macroprudential regulation calibrates prudential standards for individual institutions according 
to their systemic significance. It therefore seeks to impose more stringent regulations and 
conduct more careful monitoring on systemically important individual institutions whose 
failure could cause system-wide spillover effects (Borio, 2011; Brunnermeier et al., 2009; 
Crockett, 2000; Haldane, 2009; White, 2004).
In addition, the common individualistic ontology of microprudential and macroprudential 
regulations enables regulatory compatibility or harmony between them. Macroprudential 
regulation is not intended to replace microprudential regulation but rather to complement 
it by filling a regulatory loophole left by microprudential regulation (Baker, 2013a: 427; 
Casey, 2015: 364; Jacome and nier, 2012: 30). Macroprudential proponents stress “the need 
to supplement microprudential regulation with macroprudential regulation” (Brunnermeier 
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et al., 2009: xviii; emphasis added).1 The explanatory nonreductionism of macroprudential 
regulation makes it possible to identify systemic financial risks caused by the complex 
interaction of individual institutions, which could not be explained by the explanatory 
reductionism of microprudential regulation. However, the individualistic ontology of 
macroprudential regulation makes it dependent on ‘micro’ regulatory measures for ‘macro’ 
systemic problems, thereby rendering it compatible with microprudential regulation.
Macroprudential regulation has changed the focus of financial regulation from 
individual actions to their interactions. This change is induced by an explanatory, rather 
than ontological, shift. Macroprudential regulation ontologically recognizes nothing but 
individual institutions and thus seeks only to regulate individual institutions to rectify the 
fallacies of composition in financial markets. In this regard, it seems inappropriate to pose 
as an intriguing puzzle “a gap between the latent critical nature of that [macroprudential] 
ontology and the relatively conservative policy activity emerging from it” (Baker, 2018: 
295), because the ontological claim of macroprudential regulation is not different from that of 
microprudential regulation. Macroprudential regulation results in “the relatively conservative 
policy activity” not only because they are still in a phase of experimentation but also because 
they share an individualistic ontological assumption with microprudential regulation. There 
is no such thing as “the latent critical nature” of macroprudential ontology. In other words, 
while the relatively novelty of macroprudential regulation is derived from its nonreductionist 
explanatory assumption, the conservative nature of macroprudential regulation results from 
its individualistic ontological assumption.
4. THe MaCROsOCIal OnTOlOgy OF FInanCIal RegUlaTORy PaRaDIgM
The nonreductive individualism of macroprudential regulation sees systemic outcomes as 
emergent from the complex interaction of individual institutions. In contrast, the macrosocial 
ontology of financial regulatory paradigm acknowledges the ontological status of social 
structure and seeks to explain the micro-level actions and interactions of individuals with 
macro-level structural properties. social structure is of a dual nature in the sense that it 
provides a platform for individual actions and it is in turn formed by these actions (giddens, 
1979: 69). From the perspective of a diachronic or historical process, the current social 
structure is the result of the social interactions of individuals in the past. However, from a 
synchronic viewpoint, the current social structure is the mechanism by which individuals 
interact with each other and thus it is an entity that precedes the actions of individuals. That 
is, from a diachronic viewpoint, social structure postdates individual actions, but social 
structure predates individual actions from a synchronic viewpoint (archer, 1982: 467-468). 
In this sense, social structure and individuals are “mutually constitutive yet ontologically 
distinct entities” (Wendt, 1987: 360).
there are two distinct understandings of social structure. A material understanding of 
social structure regards it as an incentive structure faced by individuals (Waltz, 1979). since 
the outcome of a particular action depends on the incentive structure within which individual 
1 given the ‘incommensurability thesis’ of Kuhn’s (1962) paradigm shifts that different paradigms are 
not only incompatible but also incommensurable with each other (Blyth, 2013), the compatibility 
between microprudential and macroprudential regulatory measures also makes it difficult to describe 
the emergence of macroprudential regulation as a fundamental paradigm shift in a Kuhnian sense.
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actions take place, individuals always bear the impact of the incentive structure on their 
actions in mind when deciding their actions. In this regard, incentive structure constrains 
individual actions. In contrast, an ideational understanding of social structure construes it as 
a generative structure that enables the social actions of individuals (Wendt, 1999). The social 
action of individuals is not the sum of isolated individual actions, but a part of collective 
action. The individual intentionality of social action is embedded in collective intentionality 
and thus social action presupposes the existence of collective intentionality (searle, 1995). 
Ideational generative structures are collective or intersubjective understandings that constitute 
individual actions as part of collective actions by providing “reasons why things are as they 
are” and defining the boundary of a socially “accepted way of proceeding” on the basis of 
which individuals form expectations and make decisions (adler 1997, 322-323; lawson 
2012, 360-361). 
4.1. The Material Understanding of Social Structure
The material understanding of social structure interprets social structure as an incentive 
structure that constrains the action and interaction of individual actors. according to this 
view, the global financial crisis of 2008 was fundamentally caused by structural changes 
in global financial markets that started in the 1980s. Relatively tight financial regulations 
including capital controls were established after the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944, but 
began to disintegrate in the 1980s, thereby giving rise to the globalization and deregulation 
of financial markets (Helleiner, 1994). These structural changes of global financial markets 
reflected the interests of large financial institutions headquartered in new york and london 
(Bhagwati, 1998: 10-12; Frieden, 1991: 440-441). Once changes are in place, however, 
financial globalization and deregulation act as structural pressures that systemically alter 
the calculation of financial actors and thus constrain their behavior. In this sense, financial 
globalization and deregulation can be regarded as being “fully consistent with Waltz’s 
underlying conception of a structural feature of international politics: a constraining condition 
which rewards certain behaviors and punishes others” (andrews, 1994: 202).
Financial globalization and deregulation have brought about fierce competition among 
financial institutions. The increasingly intense competition “simultaneously drove down 
returns on assets and drove up target returns on equity” (Haldane, 2009). as a result, 
financial institutions were forced to resorted to excessive risk-taking. They sought to increase 
revenues by relying on increasingly more excessive leverage (Hanson et al., 2011: 20-23). 
In the course of the global financial crisis, financial institutions increased mortgage lending 
and created structured securities by relying on excessive leverage in the form of commercial 
paper (CP) and repurchase agreement (repo) transactions. With growing instability of the Us 
housing market, however, financial institutions such as Bear stearns and lehman Brothers 
had difficulty in extending credit on maturing CPs and repos and thus were caught in a 
liquidity crisis (Brunnermeier, 2009).
Financial institutions took on excessive leverage not because they could not rationally 
appraise the risk involved. This excessive risk-taking behavior was in line with the incentive 
structure created by financial globalization and deregulation. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
financial institutions were the “Masters of the Universe” in the sense that they generated 
the structural changes of financial globalization and deregulation. However, once the 
structural changes were in place, they “were quickly overwhelmed by forces they had not 
anticipated and were revealed as almost slaves of the Markets they had helped create” (Bell 
THe OnTOlOgy anD CaUsaTIOn OF FInanCIal RegUlaTORy PaRaDIgM 11
and Hindmoor, 2015: 2). Financial globalization and deregulation created a competitive 
environment by enabling free capital flows and financial innovations across the globe. The 
fierce competition caused by financial globalization “encourage[d] rational, risk-calculating 
market participants to take excessive risks” (nelson and Katzenstein, 2014: 370-372). 
To survive the excessively competitive environment of financial globalization, financial 
institutions were forced to choose risky but profitable activities.
According to the material understanding of social structure, the main cause of the 2008 
financial crisis was the structural change of the global financial market, namely globalization 
and deregulation, which had been underway since the 1980s. Financial globalization and 
deregulation created an incentive structure of fierce competition, forcing financial institutions 
to resort to excessive risk-taking to survive the competition. eventually, such risky activities 
relying on excessive leverage drove many large financial institutions to collapse, which led 
to the global meltdown of financial markets. In this regard, the material understanding of 
social structure holds that financial stability cannot be secured by managing the micro-level 
action of individual financial institutions, but only by changing the macro-level structure that 
constrains their activities.
4.2. The Ideational Understanding of Social Structure
The ideational understanding of social structure construes social structure as collective 
or intersubjective understandings that can be defined as a “collectively accepted system of 
constitutive rules.” While regulative rules constrain human action and interaction with an aim 
to “regulate antecedently existing activities” that are performed prior to and independently 
of the existence of regulative rules, constitutive rules are enabling rather than constraining in 
the sense that they do not merely regulate existing activities but “create the very possibility 
of certain activities” that regulative rules aim to constrain (searle, 1995: 27-28). More 
specifically, constitutive rules make social action possible by assigning social status to 
objects or persons in the form of X count as Y in context C. For instance, a particular piece 
of paper performs a function as money not by virtue of its intrinsic features but by virtue of 
the collective assignment of its status as a legal tender through the constitutive rules of an 
institutional monetary structure (searle, 1995).
The ideational understanding of social structure sees financial institutions and products 
as social objects whose functions are not performed because of their intrinsic qualities but 
because of its social status (Mugge and Perry, 2014: 200-201). Financial values are not 
a ‘brute fact’ that exists independently of human consciousness and intentionality but an 
‘social fact’ whose existence requires human agreements and institutions due in a large 
part to uncertainty prevalent in financial markets, in which “there is no scientific basis on 
which to form any calculable probability whatever” (Keynes, 1937: 214).2 In the context 
2 It is important to note that uncertainty is different from complexity. For example, the game of chess 
is complex but not uncertain (Katzenstein and nelson, 2013: 1103). as lockwood (2015: 727-728) 
notes, uncertainty refers to “outcomes in non-deterministic open systems, in which prediction is 
impossible not because of epistemological limitations on the part of the observer but because the 
structure of the system is such that its behavior is not amenable to prediction.” Macroprudential ideas 
stress the complexity of financial markets, which prevents individual institutions from identifying 
and managing systemic risks. In contrast, social constructivist ideas are centred on uncertainty, which 
makes financial transactions rely on a collectively accepted system of rules.
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of uncertainty, as Keynes (1936: 156) has famously described, the valuation process of 
financial assets resembles a beauty contest in which market participants seek to anticipate 
“what average opinion expects the average opinion to be” because uncertainty makes it 
impossible to construct a precise calculation about the probabilities of payoffs and the size 
of those payoffs (nelson and Katzenstein, 2014). Facing uncertainty in which there is no 
solid anchor for constructing rational expectations, financial investors look to collectively 
formed understandings to classify financial assets, form their expectations and settle on 
their decisions. In this regard, financial valuations and transactions are conducted not on the 
basis of ‘rational expectations’ but on the basis of ‘intersubjective expectations’ (Hall, 2009; 
Mugge and Perry, 2014; stellinga and Mugge, 2017).
according to this view, financial transactions can be seen not as a strategic interaction 
between instrumentally rational investors constrained by regulative rules but as a social 
interaction in which the exercise of instrumental rationality is constituted by intersubjective 
expectations generated by constitutive rules. at the heart of the constitutive rules of financial 
markets are ‘calculative devices,’ such as valuation models and risk management techniques, 
that make certain things count as tradable assets by enabling the collective assignment of 
social status in the process of standardizing, classifying and differentiating them (langley, 
2010; MacKenzie, 2006). a market is not just a place in which transactions take place but 
“a collective device for the evaluation of goods” in the sense that economic transactions 
depend on “a compromise not on values but on the instruments that calculate values” (Callon 
and Muniesa, 2005: 1239-1245). Therefore, the very existence of markets relies on socially 
authoritative calculative devices shared by market participants.
In the case of the 2008 financial crisis, what turned the Us housing market bubble into 
the worldwide financial crisis was structured financial products such as mortgage-backed 
securities (MBss) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), the essence of which was “the 
pooling of economic assets like loans, bonds, and mortgages, and the subsequent issuance 
of prioritized capital structure of claims, known as tranches, against these collateral pools” 
(Coval et al., 2009: 3). These structured financial products were so complex and opaque 
that their intrinsic values could not be correctly priced in the market. When the prospects of 
markets became murkier, the complex and obscure nature of the products caused demand 
for them to evaporate and their prices to plummet. as a result, a liquid market of structured 
financial products turned into an illiquid market, thereby jeopardizing the entire financial 
system (acharya and Richardson, 2009; Crotty and epstein, 2009; Helleiner, 2011; lawson, 
2009).
The explanation of the 2008 crisis requires an answer to the question of how it is possible 
that such complex and obscure products were constructed and transacted in the market prior 
to the crisis, that is, the ontological conditions of structured finance. Although the profit-
maximizing motives of financial investors were indispensable, the existence of structured 
finance was made possible because “a certain industry standard has been established for the 
pricing and risk management of these products” (Colander et al., 2009: 253). In other words, 
what enabled the construction and transaction of a large volume of these complex products 
was commonly shared calculative devices that collectively assigned social status to them. 
socially authoritative valuation models such as the Black-sholes model and the one-factor 
gaussian copula model, risk management techniques such as the value-at-risk model, and 
credit ratings assigned by the big three credit rating agencies (standard & Poor’s, Moody’s 
and Fitch) made it possible to standardize, classify and differentiate structured financial 
products, thereby creating intersubjective expectations among financial investors that allowed 
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them to transact enormous volumes of complex financial products prior to the 2008 financial 
meltdown (lindo, 2018; lockwood, 2015; MacKenzie, 2011). In this respect, the global 
crisis of 2008 can be seen as a ‘valuation crisis’ in which an increase in subprime mortgage 
default seriously damaged the functioning of existing constitutive rules, such as socially 
authoritative valuation models and risk management techniques. This valuation crisis made 
it impossible for financial actors to collectively constitute intersubjective expectations and 
thus prevented them from conducting stable financial transactions with each other, eventually 
resulting in a liquidity crisis in which large financial institutions collapsed (Palan, 2015; 
sinclair, 2009).
According to the ideational understanding of social structure, financial stability is 
fundamentally dependent not on the action and interaction of rational individual actors but 
on the stability of the accepted system of constitutive rules that creates the intersubjective 
expectations of financial investors by standardizing, classifying and differentiating financial 
assets through the collective assignment of social status to them.
5. COnClUsIOn
the emergence of macroprudential regulation, which aims to ensure the soundness 
of the financial system rather than that of individual institutions, has been accompanied 
by an ideational shift from a partial equilibrium analysis with a focus on the individual 
behavior of financial institutions into a general equilibrium analysis with a focus on the 
interaction between these institutions (Thiemann et al., 2018). However, this ideational 
shift of macroprudential regulation cannot be characterized as an ontological shift from 
individualistic ontology into macrosocial ontology. In terms of ontology, macroprudential 
regulation is not different from microprudential regulation: both commit to ontological 
individualism by treating economic transactions as interplays between ‘isolated atoms’ that 
exist independently of social structures (lawson, 2009). Rather, macroprudential regulation 
is characterized by a causal-explanatory shift from reductionism into nonreductionism with 
an emphasis on ‘emergent systemic properties’ resulting from the complex interaction of 
financial institutions.
While the nonreductive individualism of macroprudential regulation stresses that the 
social interaction of individuals is not causally equal and reducible to the sum of individual 
actions because social interaction gives rise to new social properties, the macrosocial 
ontology of financial regulatory paradigm maintains that social structure cannot be 
ontologically reducible to individuals because social structure constrains or enables the social 
action of individual actors. The material understanding of social structure notes that the 
intensification of competitive pressure precipitated by financial globalization led to the risky 
behavior of financial institutions and emphasizes the importance of reforming the material 
incentive structure, namely financial globalization. The ideational understanding of social 
structure emphasizes constitutive rules that generate intersubjective expectations among 
financial actors on which the very existence of financial transactions depends.
In other words, financial regulatory paradigms based on ontological individualism 
understand the collective behavior of financial markets as the result of individual behavior. 
Thereby, they seek to regulate the individual behavior of financial institutions. In contrast, 
financial regulatory paradigms based on macrosocial ontology regard the collective behavior 
of financial markets as being constrained or constructed by social structures. Therefore, they 
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aim to reconstruct social structures. Despite its emphasis on the role of collective behavior in 
causing financial instability, macroprudential regulation sees collective behavior as the result 
of individual behavior and thus seeks to regulate individual behavior because its ontological 
assumption is individualistic.
Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, global financial regulation was primarily conducted by 
microprudential regulation based on the principle of strengthening transparency. After the 
crisis, macroprudential regulation has been added to the financial regulatory framework. 
new measures such as countercyclical capital buffer and additional regulatory rules for 
systemically important financial institutions (sIFIs) have been adopted to improve systematic 
risk management under the new Basel III accord (goodhart, 2015; Underhill, 2015). as a 
result, the post-2008 global financial regulatory framework can be regarded as ‘institutional 
layering’ in which microprudential regulation is supplemented by macroprudential policy 
(Baker, 2013a).
In contrast, considerably less effort has been put into solving the problems caused by 
structural properties after the 2008 financial crisis. First, hardly any measures have been 
taken to mitigate the competitive pressure created by financial globalization. For example, 
the post-1945 Bretton Woods system focused on changing the structural properties of 
international financial markets by imposing capital controls (Helleiner, 1994). However, after 
the 2008 financial crisis, little effort was made to proactively control international capital 
flows.3 “globalization, in other words, has not been confronted directly; policy-makers are 
concentrating instead on taming some of its pre-crisis neo-liberal characteristics” (Helleiner, 
2010: 631).
nor are there any traces of significant changes in relation to financial innovation such as 
securitization. even after the financial crisis, international financial organizations have not 
attempted to directly reform financial innovation itself, arguing that securitization itself is 
not the cause of the problems raised (Financial stability Forum, 2008: 10). Consequently, no 
noticeable strengthening of public regulation has been in place with regards to calculative 
devices such as risk management models, which served as the basis for securitization. 
rather than a reform through public regulation of the ideational social structure, the pre-
crisis principle of strengthening transparency through information sharing in the market was 
applied to improve calculative devices (stellinga and Mugge, 2017).
The emergence of macroprudential regulation has changed the central focus of financial 
regulatory paradigm from the soundness of individual institutions on which microprudential 
regulation focuses into the systemic risks resulting from the complex interactions of 
individual institutions. However, the nonreductive individualism of macroprudential 
regulation has not brought about an ontological shift in financial regulation, which can be 
defined as a change in the central focus of financial regulation from individual actions and 
interactions into structural properties of global financial markets. As a result, appropriate 
efforts to reform the structural properties of the financial system have hardly been made.
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3 a noticeable change in relation to capital controls is that the IMF showed more favorable attitudes 
towards the limited use of capital controls by developing countries (Chwieroth, 2014).
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